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Significant New
Commission Developments
By PAUL RAND DIXON*

It is always a pleasure to appear before a group of antitrust
lawyers. First of all, good dining makes for a pleasant lawyer, and
I have it on judicial authority that you are a well-fed group indeed
-in a recent case it was held that a reasonable fee for your time
is $50 per hour.' After counting noses in the audience, and doing
the appropnate arithmetic, it occurred to me that I'm about to
blow quite a wad with these remarks of mine. The only thing that
persuaded me to continue beyond three minutes was a second
thought that occurred to me-maybe the $50 rate only applies
when you're standing up.
In addition, however, it could be persuasively argued that I'm
something of a contributor to your affluence, and therefore entitled
to some sort of dispensation. After all, as Mr. Rowe recently
remarked, 2 a factor that should not be overlooked is the contribution of the Robinson-Patman Act to-and I quote-"the conservation of the antitrust bar." I might add that, if enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act is all that is required, the Commission's
going to do its best to see that you continue to prosper.
But aside from any claims I might have upon you as a benefactor, I'd like to say in all seriousness that I enjoy these sessions
immensely and that I believe they are very valuable to both sides
of the fence. From where I stand, the opportunity of giving you
my views is virtually pnceless. Whether considered singly or collectively, you wield an influence that reaches throughout the length
and breadth of the economy I am sworn to serve. There are few
* Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. Chairman Dixon presented
tlus address before the Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, August
6, 1962.
1962).1 A. C. Beeken Co. v. Gemex Corp., CCH 1962 Trade Cas. ff70323 (D.C. fli.

2 Rowe, Antitrust and New Controls for Competitive Prncng, 1962 N.
Y. State

Bar Assn Antitrust Law Symposium 64.

SIGNIFICANT NEW CoMMissioN DEvELopMENTs

audiences that, when they leave the assembly hall, could go out
and do as much for the cause of antitrust as you. I think it is quite
clear that, to no small degree, the work that the Federal Trade
Commission does tomorrow will depend upon the advice you give
your clients today
Since I am not an evangelist, I do not expect, however, to be
able to convert you to all of my views on antitrust in this one
session-it will take several. In the meantime, of course, those of
us at the Federal Trade Commission will be trying our best to
communicate our views to your clients through the various legal
remedies at our disposal. Appeals to patriotism and other high
sentiments are uncertain methods of reaching antitrust violators.
The service of process, on the other hand, comes through loud and
clear. It is thus our intention to do everything we can to take the
uncertainty out of such violations-that is, to secure justice for the
public so swiftly and certainly that it will come to be regarded as
poor business to violate the antitrust laws.
Please note that infringements of the law are the activities we
wish to take the lucre out of, not business itself. In a recent address
I spoke at some length on my conviction that, when a businessman
competes vigorously and fairly, the profits that he makes, regardless
of the amount, are fully sanctioned by our law and morality, and
are a proper object of pride and self-satisfaction.3 I illustrated this
point with a little quotation that gives, I must admit, a somewhat
romantic view of the matter:
How very much he must have done for society before society
could have been prevailed upon to give him so much money
Money is the symbol of duty; it is the sacrament of having done for mankind that which mankind wanted. Mankind may not be a very good judge, but there is no better.4
But I have no sympathy for the position that, if competition
proves unprofitable, the solution is to eliminate the competition.
The lack of profits in the face of competition is merely a symptom
of the real illness and not the underlying cause. As Mr. Kaapcke,
a member of the local San Francisco bar recently put it, the only
essentials of successful business are, and I quote: "a quality product,
3

Address entitled, Current Pncmg Problems in the Distribution of Electrical
by Chauman Paul Rand Dixon, May 26, 1962.
Appliances,
4
Lewis & Steward, The Managers 10 (1961).
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a competitive price, a strong merchandising and advertising program, and a well-trained sales organization." 5
Mr. Kaapcke made another observation that I believe to be
excellent advice to lawyers who give advice to businessmen. He
said:
Even an ace salesman may feel on occasion that he ought to
take something to relieve the anxieties of repeat selling. As a
tranquilizer he may suggest some kind of preclusive arrangement that will 'sew up' the business. Frequently his counsellor can serve him best, not by prescribing some carefully
mixed legal compound, but by talking him out of it and
sending him out again with restored confidence in the
business merits of what he has to sell.
Mr. Kaapcke went on to a specific illustration:
As for resale price maintenance, I have no words of wisdom
to impart. Putting aside fair trading in the dwindling number of states where fair trade agreements can still practicably
be enforced, I do not know of any way in which the marketer
can control the retail price of his product unless he makes
the direct retail sales himself.
Our marketer may with
entire propriety suggest resale prices, but unless he likes
litigation he ought to content himself with suggestions alone
and forego the effort to 'do something' about customers who
do not follow them.
To this it might be added that Mr. Kaapcke has turned out to
be a prophet indeed as far as resale price maintenance is concerned.
A district court in Delaware, in a carefully reasoned opinion,' has
recently held that a conspiracy to maintain resale prices can
properly be inferred Ahere a manufacturer continues to sell to
retailers who do observe his "suggested" retail prices, while cutting
off those who do 77ot. In that case, by the way, the "observing"
retailers were held liable as co-conspirators, a fact which is likely
to dampen somewhat the enthusiasm of retailers for price maintenance schemes.
Now I am well aware that your clients do not hire you to
perform only the negative task of telling them what they can't do
-they want you to tell them also what they can do. And some5 Kaapcke, How to Distribute Your Products, 1962 N. Y. State Bar Ass n
Antitrust Law Symposium 56.
6 Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., CCH 1962 Trade Cas. ff70355 (D.
Del. 1962).
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times they've already decided what they're going to do, and merely
want you to tell them how to make it legal. At this point, of
course, we come to "antitrust bnnkmanship," a practice which can
prove very expensive to a client. Mr. Kaapcke, whose words I am
relying upon so heavily- this evening, suggests that the businessman
should "walk very wide" around the antitrust laws. One thing I
am very sure of: as judge Taft said many years ago, it is a dangerous
business to attempt the task of deciding how much "men ought
to be allowed to restrain competition. ' 7 The sooner the antitrust
bar realizes that there are certain practices that are illegal, and
starts to tell its clients this fact in so many words, the quicker we
can get on with the task of preserving the free-enterprise system and
the other values that depend upon it.
There is one more general remark that I would like to make
before having to descend to the specific: in antitrust, there is a
sort of tide that ebbs and flows. In one period, interest in it drops
to a low but steady glow, and then, all of a sudden, it starts to bum
at a high flame. As I think all of you can easily sense, the concept
of competition as the touchstone of prosperity is now experiencing
a renaissance, a quickening of life, throughout the world. Senator
Kefauver, speaking before the antitrust bar in New York s recently,
noted that-and I use his words-"the bracing wind of competition
is the most effective device for stimulating growth." In Europe, the
Common Market countries have plunged into the waters of competition with a vengeance, abandoning the centuries-old tradition
of cartels. So long as each was dealing with "furnners," it was all
right to fix the prices and otherwise give them the short end of the
stick-but now that it's become a family affair, the monkey-shines
have to go!
Article 85 of the 1958 Treaty of Rome provides in part:
1. There shall be prohibited, as incompatible with the Common Market, all agreements between enterpnses, all decisions
by associations of enterprises and all concerted practices
which can affect trade between the Member States and
which have as their object or result the prevention, restnction or distortion of competition with the Common Market,
in particular:
7United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified
and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
8
Kefauver, An Antitrust Leg.slative Program, 1962 N. Y. State Bar Ass n
Antitrust Law Symposium 5.
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(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices
or of any other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical developments or investment;
(c) market-shanng or the shanng of sources of supply;
(d) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking equivalent engagements in commercial transactions, thereby placing them at a commercial disadvan9
tage.
And, for violating these and other prohibitions, there is provided a penalty or fine ranging from $1,000 to $1,000,000, or 10
percent of turnoverduring the preceding year, whichever is higher '0
There can be no doubt but that the "bracing winds of competition" are blowing across all national boundaries and, if I may
wax poetic, are riding the tide of history itself. The other nations
of the world seem to have suddenly seen the folly of their state
(and privately-owned) cartels and monopolies, and the merits of
the free-enterprise system we in America have enjoyed for so long.
The irony of it all, of course, is the fact that just as Europe began
to see the light, commentators in America, especially our brothers
in the field of economics, were declaring that competition is
nothing but a "myth,""i that real competition (in the only meaningful sense, i.e., competition in price and/or quality) has long
ceased to exist in as much as two-thirds of our manufacturing
industry, 2 and that, in the exact words of one such critic, "the
entire structure of antitrust statutes in this country is a jumble of
economic irrationality and ignorance. It is the product: (1) of a
gross misinterpretation of history and (2) of the application of
3
rather naive, and certainly unrealistic, economic concepts.'
9 See, New Antitrust Rules of the Common Market, CCH Trade Reg. Rep.,
No. 39, 1201, p. 18 (June 12, 1962).
10 Id. 1316, p. 30.
i "Competition with hundreds of firms competing against each other has
been replaced by oligopoly with but a handful of large corporations sharng the
market. In what is probably the most comprehensive, up-to-date study of the
subject, Professor Carl Kaysen of Harvard University discovered that of 191 major
manufactunng industries, only 78-or 38 percent-conform to the competitive
model.
With but a handful of firms in an industry, prices no longer are
determined by the impersonal forces of the market. It's too easy for the few
remaining giants to get together and decide among themselves what the price
shall be.' Eichner, Thal by Myth, Second Coming Magazine, p. 47 (March 1962).
12 Ibid., see aiso Means, Pricing Power and the Public Interest 165, 166
(1962).
13 Greenspan, Barron s, February 5, 1962, p. 8, at 19.
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We would be the first to agree that the economy in the country,
at least in certain areas, is far from being as competitive as it
should be. But that is not to say that we regard this either as a
good thing or as something that, being inevitable, we must accept.
Quite the contrary-we believe that the death of competition in an
industry is a tragic loss to that industry in particular and to the
country at large.
While it may be true that industry concentration can make a
quick initial showing of so-called "efficiency,"' 14 it seems plain to
me that, in the long run, this proves to be illusory We are all
familiar with the fact that, when a big firm moves in for the kill
on a small one, it can soften him up with a price bombardment
that gives the housewife in the area of the "price war" a lower price
that appears for the moment to be a bargain. But the experienced
observer knows that her bubble will surely burst as soon as the
predator crushes or buys out his local competition. The first thing
he does is restore the higher price, with maybe a slight additional
increase to sweeten the pot and make up for his out-of-pocket
expenses in the skirmish.
So, too, I believe that the temporary increase in "efficiency"
that concentration brings is short-lived. Without the spur of competition-and by competition I don't mean the gentlemanly sort
that carefully refrains from lowenng the price, while running up a
big advertising bill to add to the pnce the consumer pays'S-the
necessity for reducing costs is gone and the hot wire that carnes
the dynamism of economic progress has been cut.
Interestingly enough, it seems that the courts here have caught
something of the new spirit of competition that I have mentioned.
By that I don't mean, of course, that every judge in the land is
vying with every other to see which can give the Commission the
most favorable decision. Far from it! As you know, we've taken
our lumps in the courts recently But by and large the antitrust
14 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 1170366, at
76489 n.28, 76500; Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, CCH 1961 Trade Cas.
70038, at 78162, 78163, cert. derned, 82 Sup. Ct. 1581 (June 25, 1962).
15 "Every act of nonprice competition may be used as a sign directed

towards cornp etitors, telling them, as it were: 'You see, I will not cut prices; I
confine myself to those more civilized ways of competingi I trust you will do

likewise.
In other words, oligopolistic nonpnce competition may be more
m the nature of a manoeuvre to avoid pnce competition than a manoeuvre to
compete for customers and increase sales at the expense of competitors." Machlup,
The Economics of Sellers Competition 459 (1952).
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decisions are beginning to reflect a full understanding of the
national policy favoring competition, even if it means a temporary
sacrifice of so-called "efficiency" to other values that we deem even
more valuable. I think Monday, June 25, 1962, a red-letter day for
antitrust in the Supreme Court, gives some inkling of this. The
Court vacated and remanded an appellate court decision adverse
to a treble damage claimant; 16 held that corporate officers are
criminally liable under the Sherman Act;1 7 reversed and remanded
a case involving a purported cost justification under the RobinsonPatman Act;' 8 affirmed a trial court's condemnation of a merger
under the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act;'19 and denied certioran
from an appellate court's affirmance of one of our own merger
cases.

20

There is no way of knowing, of course, whether or not this
quickening of the antitrust pulse in the courts is related to the
tang in the air brought here from Europe's Common Market. But
one thing is certain: the European expenment plainly represents
a vote of confidence for the competitive free-enterpnse system.
And, since the nations who signed the Treaty of Rome in 1958
did so after a most thorough expenence with cartels, and after
having observed the American experiment with competition, they
can hardly be charged with having conceived the antitrust features
of their rules in a state of 19th Century "economic irrationality
and ignorance." What is more, there is the interesting coincidence
of phenomenal economic growth occurring at the particular time
when trade barriers were replaced by free competition. There's no
quarreling with success!
I believe, in short, that our collective economic and political
life depends upon the performance that our economy can deliver
in the next few decades, and that the quality of that national performance, in turn, depends upon creating and maintaining the
sharpest degree of competition in all of our vital industries.
16 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., CCH 1962 Trade

Cas. 770361.
i United States v. Wise, CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 970362; United States v.
Kinss, CCH 1962 Trade Cas. f170363; United States v. Staley, CCH 1962 Trade
Cas. 70364.
Is United States v. Borden Co., CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 1170365.
19
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 170366.
20
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, CCH 1961 Trade Cas. 170038, cert.
de-ned, 82 Sup. Ct. 1581 (June 25, 1962).
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This, then, is my concept of the "public interest" that the
Federal Trade Commission is charged with protecting.
THE CASE FOR THE "SMALL" CASE

The antitrust agencies are frequently criticized for peering
so intently into mice-holes that they don't notice when an elephant
rumbles by them. The first answer is that some of the so-called
"little" cases involve a pnnciple that must be protected for its own
sake. As the Supreme Court said in one false advertising case:
"To fail to prohibit such evil business practices would be to
elevate deception in business and to give to it the standing of
dignity and truth."'
The second answer is that certain types of 'little" offenses are,
when first perceived, just beginning to grow To illustrate what I
mean, let me use a more helpful analogy than the one of the mice
and the elephants: one of our staff attorneys characterizes the two
classes of offenses dealt with by the Commission as "cubs" and
"tigers." His point, of course, is that tiger cubs grow up to be
tigers, not pussy-cats. Now, the cubs are cute little things, fuzzywuzzy, and all that-but the fact remains that they're still tigers,
and that one of these days they're going to be full-grown.
We all agree that the Sherman Act is big artillery, and useful
chiefly when hunting big game. The Federal Trade Commission
Act, on the other hand, has two barrels: one is for reaching the
more obvious types of restraints upon trade,22 while the other is to
be used for "incipient" restraints.
It is the latter pnnciple that I would like to emphasize here.
We were created for the major purpose of seeing that tiger cubs
never get a chance to grow up to be tigers. The great flaw in the
Sherman Act-the thing that caused Congress to reconsider the
problem of the trusts in 1914 and pass both the Federal Trade
Commission and the Clayton Acts-was that the courts wouldn't
let the Sherman Act be used until the tiger was full-grown and,
indeed, had drawn his first blood. At that point, of course, it takes
no philosopher to see the stripes and know that this is indeed a
dangerous creature.
v. Standard Educ. Soc y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
FTC v. Cement Institute, 833 U.S. 683 (1948).

221FTC
2
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With the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
Congress expressed the will of the people that there be created an
office of national zoology, to be staffed with experts who, by reason
of their training and experience, could rccognize the tiger before
its stripes began to show or its claws became red. A cub is not a
kitten, and the tendency to confuse the two, merely because they
both belong to the cat family, can be disastrous for competition.
It is of course a valid observation that, so long as tie performance of the antitrust agencies is measured by the number of
proceedings brought or completed, the smaller cases and the consent order procedure "could encourage a type of numbers game."3
At the Federal Trade Commission we realize fully that there has
to be some yardstick for dctcrmining how well we arc doing our
jobs. But we do not believe that numbers are the sole criterion. If
numbers were all we were after, I can tell you for a fact that, with
the new procedures and tools recently fashioned, the Commission
could have racked up quite a score in the past twelve months.
Let me illustrate: recently we sent section 6(b )2 -4 special report
orders to several hundred department stores requiring data as to
their dealings with suppliers of wearing apparel. The answers, all
under oath by the responding companies, provided us with all the
evidence necessary for the filing of more than a hundred per se
cases under the Robinson-Patman Act. We have held these on
suspense, however, pending further investigation so that, to the
extent compatible with the public interest, the various competitors
in the industry shall be treated fairly It should be noted that
fair treatment, in our view, does not mean that the ones who are
caught go free, but that we broaden the sweep of our net to bring
the others to the bar as well. Another illustration of this principle
is the recent action of the Commission in suspending adjudication
on four cases (charging misrepresentation in the sale of analgesic
23 "Because of the ease in writing consent orders and decrees, they could
encourage a type of numbers game. Over the years, the most important factors
used to judge the work of the Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade Commission
have been the number of cases they have instituted and the number of their
wins. Obviously, the consent procedure enables an adrmistrator to exhibit a
lughly successful statistical record, even if the program has little effect on
competition. Consent procedures invite an administrator to build a good record
by filing cases against small compames m unimportant industries." Massel,
Competition and Monopoly 151 (1962).
24 Section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721 (1914),
15 U.S.C. §46 (1958).
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preparations) pending the conclusion of an investigation to determine whether or not others in the industry are engaging in the
25 "simulsame practices. This will permit, as our order reads,
taneous action where deemed warranted."
Another answer to the criticism of our moving against the
so-called minor violations is the simple fact that, in most cases, the
victim complains. When a citizen points a public law officer to a
plain violation of law, shows that he is being hurt by it, and
correctly states that he has no other legal recourse in any other
forum, simple justice requires that the officer do more than tell
the citizen that, although a wrong, it is beneath the law's notice.
The solution, of course, is to devise a way to handle these
smaller and more obvious cases with, so to speak, the agency's left
hand-leaving the real muscle free to handle the larger ones. They
must be dealt with, but the time and effort devoted to them
should be scaled down to their true significance, so that our
energies are not diverted from the rumbling herd of elephants.
Then, too, there is the problem of dealing with that large
number of cases where the law is settled and the facts are clear.
In many of these cases it is obvious to everyone concerned that
the respondent is merely buying time in which to continue an
illegal but lucrative practice. The story is told-a somewhat
apocryphal one, I trust-of the client who told his counsel that
he needed two more years to finish "milking" the profitability out
of a practice that was patently deceptive. At the end of that time,
he would be happy to move on to greener pastures. In the meantime, however, he wanted to know if counsel could delay the
inevitable cease-and-desist order for two years. Counsel could,
and did!
Congress has not yet provided us with the authority to issue a
temporary cease-and-desist order in a situation of this kind. I am
still hopeful it will. We believe, however, that we can and should
make better use of our accumulated experience and knowledgeour expertise, if you please-in the handling of many of these cases.
This we are doing by more extensive use of "official notice" and by
promulgation of "trade regulation rules."
25 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. f115955 (FTC Docket Nos. 8318-21, Orders of
June 25, 1962).
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Official Notice. I invite your attention to our recent decision
in the matter of Manco Watch Strap Co.,20 where we took "official
notice" of two facts that have been long established over the years
by our experience. One of the facts was that a substantial portion
of the American public believes a product is of domestic origin if it
is not marked to the contrary, and the other was that they prefer a
domestic over a foreign product. These are facts which have been
proven time and time again in other Commission proceedings. We
recognize, of course, that there are well-known exceptions to these
presumptions-perfumes, caviar, champagne, etc. But, as we said:
"[W]e are not barred from taking official notice of a general fact
merely because it is not a universal fact." The law2" and the
Commission's Rules of Practice 8 provide ample opportunity for a
respondent to show that an "officially noted fact" is not true in
his particular case.
Trade Regulation Rules. This past June we announced the
adoption of procedures for the promulgation of what we chose to
term "Trade Regulation Rules."29 These rules "express the expenence and judgment of the Commission, based on facts of which it
has knowledge derived from studics, reports, investigations, hearings, and other proceedings, or within official noticc, concerning
the substantive requirements of the statutes which it administers."a °
The procedures provide for the publication of proposed rules
in the Federal Register; the giving of notice as to when interested
parties may present written data, vicws, and argument; the holding
of hearings; and all other procedural safeguards. Additionally,
when the Commission relics upon such a rule in a proceeding,
the respondent will be "given a fair hearing on the legality and
propriety of applying the rule to the particular case.""1
There has been considerable discussion of these new procedures,
263 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 115781 (1961).
See also the complaint in
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 3 CCII Trade Reg. Rep. 115864 (1961), which
alleges these two facts and follows with the statement that each is "a fact of which
the Commission takes official notice."
27Administrative Procedure Act, §7(d), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§1006(d) (1958).
28 FTC Rules of Practice, Procedures and Organization, 16 C.F.R. §4.12(c)
(Supp. 1960).
"OlId. H§1.61-.71.
30 Id. §1.61 (Emphasis added.)
31

Id. §1.63.
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both pro32 and con.3 3 You can be assured, however, that they will
be applied with the utmost fairness and in full accord with all
procedural and constitutional safeguards. One of our purposes is
simply to let it be known that, in our considered judgment, the
practices involved are condemned by established law The rules,
in short, will constitute fair warning to the business community
that indulgence in those practices is an invitation to litigation with
the Federal Trade Commission. In publishing such a clear
warning we are but fulfilling a desire for clarity that is older than
our statute itself. President Woodrow Wilson stated in 1914:
Surely we are sufficiently familiar with the actual processes
and methods of monopoly and of the many hurtful restraints
of trade to make definition possible, at any rate up to the
limits of what experience has disclosed. These practices,
being now abundantly disclosed, can be explicitly and itemby-item forbidden by statute in such terms as will practically
eliminate uncertainty,
the law itself and the penalty being
34
made equally plain.
Advisory Opinions. Another procedure we have recently adopted
provides for advisory opinions by the Commission with respect to
proposed courses of action. 35 This procedure was adopted to afford
businessmen assistance in determining, in advance whether a proposed course of action, if pursued, may violate any of the laws
administered by the Commission. Any person, partnership or
corporation may request advice from the Commission concerning
the applicability of laws administered by it to a particular course
of action by addressing a request to the Secretary and submitting
full and complete information. On the basis of the facts submitted,
as well as other information available, the Commission will, where
practicable, advise the requesting party whether or not the proposed
course of action, if pursued, would be likely to result in further
action by the Commission. Any such advice, necessarily will be
without prejudice to the right of the Commission to reconsider
32 See Addresses of Commissioner Macintyre of December 28, 1961 (See, 5
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1155110, for summary); March 18, 1962; and May 16, 1962.
33 Rowe, Antitrust and New Controls for Competitive Pricing, 1962 N. Y.
State Bar Ass n Antitrust Law Symposium 69.
34 Quoted in Maclntyre s Addess, Exchange of Views-Government and
Business,
National Account Managers Ass n, March 18, 1962.
3

5 FTC Rules of Practice, Procedure and Organzation, 16 C.F.R. §§1.91-.93

(1960).
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the questions and, where the public interest requires, to rescind
or revoke the advice. But the information submitted will not be
used as a basis for a proceeding against a requesting party without
pnor notice and opportunity to discontinue the course of action
pursued in good faith in reliance upon the Commission's advice.
The announcement of this new procedure has elicited widespread interest on the part of businessmen, the bar and certain
trade publications. So far I have not heard, nor do I expect to hear
an accusation from the American Bar Association that, in giving
this kind of advice, we are depnving lawyers of a source of income.
We think we are moving towards the fulfillment of one of the
most important roles for which the Commission was created, that
is, to assist businessmen in secunng a better understanding of their
responsibilities under the law.
THE CASES

Since the members of this group read the antitrust decisions
before the ink is dry, I'll try to limit my remarks to only a few of
the cases that I believe are significant.
Special Reports Under 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. From the standpoint of the Commission, one of the most
important cases of the past year was the St. Regis decision of the
Supreme Court. 6 As the Court had said in an earlier decision
similarly involving 6(b) reports-the Morton Salt case 37-the power
of investigation is one "without which all others would be vain."
St. Regis had, in the words of the Court, "defied large parts of the
orders." For this defiance it paid penalties totalling $57,700,
representing the statutory rate of $100 per day for the refusal to
respond. In addition, the Court sustained our right to St. Regis'
retained copy of its census report.
As a result of this decision, the Commission's efforts to get at
the facts have been much more productive. At one time, there was
the complaint that the Commission was bcing unfair if it proceeded
against one company engaged in an unlawful practice without
simultaneously proceeding against all other members of the industry Now, when we oblige the critics by doing equal justice to all,
we hear the versatile 6(b) spccial report characterized as a "mail36

St. Regis Paper Co. v. FTC, CCH 1961 Trade Cas. 70167.

37 United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 643 (1950).
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order investigation kit." But be all that as it may, the report is
undoubtedly one of the fairest and most useful investigative tools
the Commission has. With it, we can in fact make a quick,
industry-wide investigation that would be physically impossible if
attempted by shoe-leather. I have already referred to our department store inquines.38 In addition, this technique is being used
in several other areas, including: Robinson-Patman Act inquiries
in the publishing, drug, and bread industries; advertising probes in
regard to certain weight-reducing devices, cold remedies, pain
remedies, and air purifiers; and in market-measurement surveys in
merger cases.
In the latter connection, the Commission may ultimately use
its Bureau of Economics and the 6(b) special report power to
study selected areas of the economy to determine which are most
likely to have antitrust "elephants" running amuck in them. With
this information we believe we can more intelligently select the
targets for our adjudicative proceedings.
Investigational Hearings. As you all know, the Commission
continued its inquiries of the St. Regis Company in public investigational hearings, these being held before the Commission sitting
en banc. 0 Similar hearings have been and are now being conducted
by the staff in an investigation of the milk industry Despite the
outcry against these proceedings, there is no doubt in our mind
that they are fully sanctioned by precedent and constitutional
principles.
Subpoenas Duces Tecum. I hear a rumor that the corporate
form of doing business is being abandoned in favor of the partnership and individual propnetorship since the decision in the Harreli
case. 40 There is was held that the Commission's subpoena power
is limited to corporations, and that accordingly we had no authority
to subpoena "individuals doing business as individuals and not as a
corporation." It goes without saying that this case is being appealed.
In FTC v St. Regis Paper Co.,41 the Seventh Circuit sustained
our subpoena against the claim of accountant-client privilege; in
38 Note 24 supra and accompanying text.
39 See comment, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 150117.
40 FTC v. Harrell, CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 1170326 (E.D. Ill.
1962).
4
1 CCH 1962 Trade Cas. U170373 (7th Cir. 1962).
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FTC v Standard American, Inc.,2 it was held that we had the
right to take the documents to Washington for examination and
copying; in FTC v Ace Books, Inc., 43 the court ordered the return
on the subpoena at the company's own offices, and denied a claim
for the advancement of the cost of production; and in Adams v
FTC,44 and FTC v Cooper,3 the subpoenas were generally sustained over claims of irrelevance.
Access to Evidence. Although not involving our own investigative powers, the InternationalNickel case46 posed an interesting
issue. The Commission, now in the course of investigating to
determine whether or not defendants in fifty-six Antitrust Division
cases are complying with those judgments, called on the International Nickel firms in New York and claimed "access" to various
papers pursuant to a provision in the decree giving such a nght
to representatives of the Department of Justice. (Our attorneys
had been appointed agents of the Department.) The defendants
claimed the right to select the papers to be seen by our attorneys,
and we asserted the right to at least be present at the file cabinets
while the selection was going on. The Court held adversely to the
Commission, basing its decision on the fact that the word "access"
in the consent decree was qualified by the phrase "relating to any
matters contained in the judgment." Our own "access" powers
under section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act were not
involved.
Mergers. Turning to the substantive law, I'm sure we can all
agree that the most significant merger case during the year was
Brown Shoe. I won't attempt to trespass on Judge Loevinger's
territory
In our own bailiwick, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v FTC.48 (The Ninth Circuit had affirmed our order requiring Crown to divest itself of the stock and
assets acquired from St. Helena Pulp & Paper Company in 1953.
That opinion is particularly significant for its extensive discussion
42195

F Supp. 801 (E.D. Pa. 1961).

43 CCH 1961 Trade Gas. 1170164 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

44CCH 1961 Trade Cas. 1170159 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. dened, 869 U.S. 864
(April 30, 1962).
45CCH
1962 Trade Cas. 1170353 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
6

447 CCH 1962 Trade Gas. 170279 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
4

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, CCH 1962 Trade Gas. 170866.
sCCH 1961 Trade Gas. 1170088, cert. denied, 82 Sup. Gt. 1581 (June 25,

1962).

1963]

SiGimcAwT NEW COMMISSION DxEropmENTs

of the proper standards for establishing the relevant lines of coinmerce and sections of the country )
On September 25, 1962, the Commission, in the Union Carbide
case,49 ordered that company to divest itself of Visking, a customer
that used polyethylene resin in producing polyethylene film. The
acquiring company was permitted to retain a newly constructed
film-producing plant, thus adding a new competitor to the field.
On April 30, 1962, in the Foremost Dairies case,50 that company was ordered to divest itself of ten dairy companies it had
acquired.
In Procter 6 Gamble, the first "conglomerate" merger case, the
hearing examiner has once again ruled that section 7 was violated
by the acquisition of Chlorox.5 1 This case is now pending before
the Commission for final decision on a petition for review
One of the most recent .complaints filed by the Commission
under section 7 is that against Grand Union,52 charging that the
big grocery firm violated the statute by acquiring two competing
chain stores. This case, by the way, was tried under our new rules
and comes very close to illustrating the kind of expedition we like
in the big case. Hearings were held daily for four weeks, dunng
which eighty-two witnesses testified.
Price Discrimination and Exclusive Dealing. The RobinsonPatman Act continues to be a prolific source of litigation and
controversy Perhaps the most hotly disputed issue during the past
year has been the "meeting competition" defense under 2(b) And
it is here that the Commission has taken its worst drubbing in the
courts. In the Exquisite Form case 3 we had held that, under the
express wording of the statute itself, the defense of "meeting
competition" was not available in a 2(d) case. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed us, 4 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 5 5 The Seventh Circuit, relying upon
Exquisite Form, reached a similar conclusion in the Shulton case.5 6
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1115503 (1962).
1115877 (1962).
51 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1115773 (1962).
52 3 CCIt Trade Reg. Rep. 1115680 (1962).
53 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., No. 6966, FTC, 1961. For a smilar case,
see Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535 (1956).
54 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, CCH 1961 Trade Cas. 1170157
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
55
FTC v. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
5
0 Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, CCH Trade Cas. 1170321 (7th Cir. 1962).
49 3

50 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
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The second development in the 2(b) area was the Seventh
Circuit's reversal of our holding in Sunshine Biscuits57 that the
"meeting competition" defense is available only as a defensive
shield to retain old customers, and not as an offensive weapon to
take customers away from a competitor.
Another feature of the "meeting competition" defense-granting a lower price to a customer so he can meet his competion-has
been before us again. Our earlier ruling in Sun Oil, set aside by
the Fifth Circuit,58 is now pending before the Supreme Court on
certioran. In the meantime, in American Oil Co.,59 the Commission has again rejected the defense in this situation.
The other Robinson'Patman defense, cost justification, has been
greatly clarified by the Supreme Court's June 25th decision in
Borden. 0 Again I won't dwell in Judge Loevinger's province,
except to say that the Court remanded the case on the point that
the trial court, in sustaining the defense, had permitted too broad
an averaging of group costs, without an adequate showing that
there was a reasonable correlation between those average cost figures
and the cost of doing business with the individual members who
composed the group.
Section 5-Restraint of Trade. During the past year the Commission has dealt with a host of traditional restraints of trade under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Two of its
opinions involved somewhat similar practices: resale price fixing
between a supplier and its customers, and restricting the customers,
in the resale of the goods, to specific geographical territories. In
Sandura,61 both of these practices were condemned by the Commission. In Snap-On Tools,6" the hearing examiner had concluded
that these restrictions were lawful because their purpose was to
prevent buyers from playing off one dealer against another in the
hope of obtaining a lower price. The Commission, speaking
through Commissioner Elman, answered that novel proposition
in these words:
573 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
15469 (1962), revd, Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v.
FTC,58306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961).
593
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 015961 (1962).
60
United States v. Borden Co., CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 70365. Cf. The
Borden Co 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 0f15634 (1962).
61 SanAura Co No. 7042, FTC, 1962.
623 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 015546 (1962).
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But we think that precisely the converse is true. 'Playing-off'
one dealer against another 'in the hope of obtaining a lower
price is the essence of competition.
In addition to the traditional types of restrains of trade involved
in the cases just mentioned, the Commission has of course provoked considerable controversy with its use of section 5 to reach
restraints within the-and I quote-"spirit" of some of the specific
statutory provisions enforced by it. The most notable matters in
this area are the companion cases of Grand Umon63 and American
News. 4 There, on February 7, 1962, the Second Circuit sustained
our holdings that it is an unfair method of competition in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to knowingly induce discriminatory advertising allowances. The argument
that we were "legislating" new law was rejected. As the Court
said in Grand Union:
Jurisdiction, perhaps, has been expanded from the technical
confines of Section 2(d), but only fully to realize the basic
policy of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The raising of money for promotional purposes by passing the
hat among one's suppliers was also condemned as a violation of
section 5 by a court of appeals in our Giant Food case,6 5 and by
the Commission itself again in the Macy case. 66
Some of you will recall that at your meeting in St. Louis last
year I discussed our then recent staff reorganization and revisions
of our rules of practice. We anticipated that these actions would
cause some unrest, or turmoil, among our staff and some criticisms
from members of the bar and others, and they did. I am pleased
to report now that the shake-down period appears to be over and
that, for the most part, both the reorganization and the new rules
are working well. We still have problems and we are still being
criticized. So long as the criticisms are directed at things we are
doing, or trying to do, rather than at things we are not doing, I am
not too worned.
63 Grand Umon Co. v. FTC, CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 1170224 (2d Cir. 1962).
64

Amencan News Co. v .FTC, CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 1170225 (2d Cir. 1962).
65 Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC. CCH 1962 Trade Cas. 1170351. (D.C. Cir. 1962).
661R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1115895 (1962).

